Nicias
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Nicias | |
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Native name | Νικίας Νικηράτου Κυδαντίδης |
Born | c. 470 BC Athens, Greece |
Died | 413 BC (aged 56/57) Syracuse, Sicily |
Allegiance | Athens |
Rank | Strategos |
Known for | Peace of Nicias |
Battles / wars | |
Other work | Peace of Nicias |
Nicias (/ˈnɪʃiəs/; Ancient Greek: Νικίας Νικηράτου Κυδαντίδης, romanized: Nikias Nikēratou Kydantidēs; c. 470–413 BC)[a] was an Athenian politician and general, who was prominent during the Peloponnesian War. A slaveowning member of the Athenian aristocracy, he inherited a large fortune from his father, and had investments in the silver mines around Laurion, in south-east Attica.
Following the death of Pericles in 429 BC, Nicias became the principal rival of Cleon and the democrats in the struggle for political leadership of the Athenian state. Politically a moderate conservative, he opposed the aggressive imperialism and warmongering of Cleon and Alcibiades. Despite his political views, he served as strategos (general) during the war, and led a number of expeditions, although these achieved little. Nicias' goal was to conclude a peace with Sparta on terms favourable to Athens, and he was largely responsible for the successful negotiations which led to the Peace of Nicias in 421 BC.
In 415 BC, Nicias was appointed commander of Athens' ill-fated Sicilian Expedition. A series of disasters led to the destruction of the Athenian forces, and Nicias was executed by the Syracusans in 413 BC.
Early life and political rise
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Nicias was born c.470 BC in Athens. His wealthy, slaveowning family was aristocratic, and strictly adhered to conservative principles politically. He inherited a fortune from his father, Niceratus, and had considerable interests in the silver mines of Laurion.[1] Xenophon wrote of "how once on a time Nicias, the son of Niceratus, owned a thousand men [slaves] in the silver mines, whom he let out to Sosias, a Thracian".[2]
Nicias' rise to prominence occurred while Pericles was at the head of the Athenian government. After Pericles' death in 429 BC, Nicias became an important Athenian politician with the aristocratic (conservative) party looking to him as their leader and, as such, he became the rival of Cleon's popular or democratic party.[3] J. B. Bury wrote that Nicias lacked the ability to lead a political party, since he "had not the qualities of a leader or a statesman".[4] As for how Nicias came to wield influence, Bury referred to his honesty and integrity in that he was impervious to bribes. He was also considered respectable, given his family background, and he was acknowledged to be well acquainted with military details; but perhaps his strongest quality was his devoutly unscrupulous devotion to religion.[4]
Plutarch remarked on Nicias' generosity as, in the main, he used his wealth to patronise charitable causes and religious festivals. He gained prestige by sponsoring construction of both a statue of Athena and a shrine to Dionysus.[3] Plutarch specifically mentioned Nicias' support for the annual Festival of Delos. He paid for the construction of a bridge of boats between Delos and Rheneia. This bridge, extravagantly decorated with garlands and tapestry, enabled a richly-dressed chorus to walk across to Rheneia. Nicias donated 10,000 drachma, so the Delians could continue to stage the event, and pray on his behalf. His instructions were engraved on a pillar.[3]
Military career
[edit]Nicias was strategos in both 427 and 425 BC. During these years, he was a very cautious general, and avoided engagement in any important military enterprise during his time as commander. According to Plutarch, this was to his benefit, as Nicias was able to avoid the worst of Athens' misfortunes, both military and political.[3] Plutarch held that "Nicias declined all difficult and lengthy enterprises; if he took a command, he was for doing what was safe". However, Plutarch noted that, on the battlefield, Nicias was recognised as a fair combatant, fighting as courageously as any other soldier.[3]
Peace of Nicias (421 BC)
[edit]In 423 BC, after a decade of fighting had left both sides exhausted, their respective anti-war factions sought to initiate peace talks.[5] In Athens, there was increasing concern about the success of Sparta's most effective general, Brasidas, who was campaigning in Chalcidice, Thrace, and Macedonia.[6] The Athenian general Laches, supported by Nicias, sought to counter this by calling on the Ecclesia to seek an armistice. His motion was carried.[7] J. B. Bury argued that this policy was misguided. He supported Cleon's counter-argument that Athens should not have pursued peace "until the success of Brasidas had been decisively checked" and some degree of prestige restored.[5] Bury said the resolve of the Athenians was undermined by Nicias and Laches, whose case rested on "the feelings of the hour", whereas Cleon called on them "to weigh considerations of policy".[5]
However, the "Truce of Laches" had little impact on Brasidas and collapsed within a year. The town of Scione, in Chalcidice, revolted against Athens and swore allegiance to Brasidas.[8] Soon afterwards, the neighbouring town of Mende followed suit.[9] Brasidas was then needed to reinforce his ally Perdiccas against hostile Illyrians in Macedonia. While Brasidas was away, Athens sent Nicias to Chalcidice in command of a large relief force which recaptured Mende and besieged Scione.[10]
The fragile truce was finally ended when Cleon resolved to rescue the town of Amphipolis in Macedonia.[10] In the ensuing Battle of Amphipolis, the Spartans routed the Athenians, but both Brasidas and Cleon were killed—thereby removing the key members of the pro-war factions on both sides.[11] Thucydides wrote that this left Pleistoanax, of Sparta, and Nicias as "the foremost candidates for power in either city".[11] Each had their reasons for desiring peace. Pleistoanax sought restoration as King of Sparta, and Nicias "wished to secure his good fortune".[11] Thucydides said Nicias wanted only to be remembered by posterity as "an ever-successful statesman", and thought securing a peace would be the means to that end.[11]
So, in 421 BC, Nicias and Pleistoanax negotiated the Peace of Nicias between Athens and Sparta, bringing the war to a temporary conclusion. The essence of this truce was a return to the pre-war situation in that most wartime gains were to be forfeited. As a result, Amphipolis was restored to Athens, in return for the release of the prisoners Athens had taken at the Battle of Sphacteria in 425 BC.[citation needed] Among other conditions were the opening of temples throughout Greece to worshippers from all cities. The autonomy of the Delphic Oracle was restored.[citation needed] Athens would continue to collect tribute from states in the Delian Confederacy, as it had done from the time of Aristides, but it could not force these states to become allies.[citation needed] Athens also agreed to come to Sparta's aid if the helots revolted.[citation needed] All of Sparta's allies agreed to sign the peace, except for the Boeotians, Corinth, Elis, and Megara.[citation needed]
Nicias and Alcibiades
[edit]While the Peace was being negotiated, Alcibiades first rose to prominence in Athens. He opposed the Peace and argued strongly for Athens to continue the war. His first move was convincing Argos to form an alliance,[3] and he continued to advocate aggressive Athenian action after the Peace was signed.[citation needed] Historians A. W. Gomme and Raphael Sealey believed, as Thucydides reported, that Alcibiades was "offended with the Lacedaemonians for having negotiated the treaty through Nicias and Laches, and having overlooked him on account of his youth".[12][13][14]
Disputes over the interpretation of the treaty led the Spartans to dispatch ambassadors to Athens with full powers to arrange all unsettled matters. The Athenians initially received these ambassadors well, but Alcibiades met with them in secret before they were to speak to the Ecclesia and told them that the Assembly was haughty and had great ambitions.[15] He urged them to renounce their diplomatic authority to represent Sparta, and instead allow him to assist them through his influence in Athenian politics.[16]
The representatives agreed and, impressed with Alcibiades, they distanced themselves from Nicias, despite him being sincere in wanting to reach an agreement with the Spartans.[17] The next day, during the Assembly, Alcibiades asked them what powers Sparta had granted them to negotiate and they replied, as agreed, that they had not come with full and independent powers. This was in direct contradiction to what they had said the day before, and Alcibiades seized on this opportunity to denounce their character, cast suspicion on their aims, and destroy their credibility. This ploy increased Alcibiades' standing while embarrassing Nicias, and Alcibiades was subsequently appointed General. He took advantage of his increasing power to orchestrate the creation of an alliance between Argos, Elis, Mantinea, and other states in the Peloponnese, threatening Sparta's dominance in the region. This alliance, however, was ultimately defeated in 418 BC at the Battle of Mantinea.[18]
Nicias and Hyperbolos (416–415 BC)
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During the years 416 BC and 415 BC, a complex struggle took place between Hyperbolos on one side and Nicias and Alcibiades on the other. Hyperbolos tried to bring about the ostracism of one of this pair, but Nicias and Alcibiades combined their influence to induce the people to expel Hyperbolos instead.[19] This incident reveals that Nicias and Alcibiades each commanded a personal following, whose votes were determined by the wishes of the leaders.[14]
Plutarch was of the view that the Athenians were so angered by this cynical manoeuvring that the ostracism was never to be used again.[20]
The Sicilian Expedition (415–413 BC)
[edit]In 415 BCE, delegates from the Sicilian city of Segesta (Egesta) arrived in Athens to plead for the support of the Athenians in their war against Selinus.[citation needed] During the subsequent debates, Nicias vehemently opposed an Athenian intervention, using the argument that the campaign would be excessively costly if it was to be successful.[citation needed] He attacked the character and motives of Alcibiades, who was a strong supporter of the expedition.[citation needed]
Alcibiades argued that a Sicilian campaign would bring riches to the city and expand the empire, just as the Persian Wars had.[citation needed] It was at Nicias' suggestion that the size of the fleet was significantly increased from 60 ships to "140 triremes, 5,100 hoplites, and about 1,300 archers, slingers, and light armed men".[21]
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Nicias' intention may have been to shock the Ecclesia with his high estimate of the forces required, but, instead of dissuading his fellow citizens, his analysis made them all the more eager, and the campaign motion was carried.[citation needed] Against his wishes Nicias was appointed strategos along with Alcibiades and Lamachus. All three were given full powers to use their discretion and act in the best interests of Athens while in Sicily.[citation needed] In 414 BC, Athens responded to appeals from Nicias by sending out 73 vessels and 5,000 soldiers to Sicily under the command of the Athenian generals, Demosthenes and Eurymedon, to assist Nicias and his forces at the siege of Syracuse.[citation needed]
The Athenian army moved to capture Syracuse while the larger fleet of Athenian ships blocked the approach to the city from the sea.[citation needed] After some initial success, the Athenian troops became disorganized in the chaotic night operation and were thoroughly routed by Gylippus.[citation needed] Lamachus and Eurymedon were killed, and Nicias, although ill, was left in sole charge of siege operations.[citation needed]
Demosthenes proposed that the Athenians immediately give up the siege of Syracuse and return to Athens, where they were needed to defend the city against a renewed Spartan invasion of Attica, which had been inspired by Alcibiades. Nicias refused to leave Sicily because, according to Plutarch, he preferred to be killed by the enemy, rather than by the Athenians, who would condemn him if he withdrew following a defeat.[citation needed]
Death (413 BC)
[edit]The Syracusans and Spartans under Hermocrates were able to trap the Athenians in the harbour, and the Athenians sustained heavy losses in the second Battle of Syracuse.[citation needed] Demosthenes was ambushed by the Syracusans and was forced to surrender. Nicias was soon captured as well, and both were executed by allied forces despite Gylippus' orders to the contrary.[citation needed] Most of the surviving Athenian soldiers were kept in the stone quarries near Syracuse (as there was no other room for them), where many died slowly of disease and starvation. Few survivors returned to Athens.[citation needed]
Notes
[edit]- ^ public domain: Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). "Nicias (statesman)". Encyclopædia Britannica. Vol. 19 (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 658. This article incorporates text from a publication now in the
References
[edit]- ^ Bury 1975, p. 266.
- ^ Xenophon (1891) [355 BC]. Dakyns, H. G. (ed.). "Ways and Means". Macmillan. Retrieved 8 February 2025.
- ^ a b c d e f Plutarch 1859c, p. 1.
- ^ a b Bury 1975, p. 267.
- ^ a b c Bury 1975, p. 281.
- ^ Bury 1975, pp. 279–281.
- ^ Bury 1975, pp. 281–282.
- ^ Thucydides 1874d, p. 120.
- ^ Bury 1975, p. 282.
- ^ a b Bury 1975, p. 283.
- ^ a b c d Thucydides 1874e, p. 16.
- ^ Thucydides 1874e, p. 43.
- ^ Gomme 1963, p. 339.
- ^ a b Sealey 1976, p. 353.
- ^ Plutarch 1859a, pp. 14–16.
- ^ Thucydides 1874e, p. 45.
- ^ Plutarch 1859a, p. 16.
- ^ Plutarch 1859a, p. 15.
- ^ Plutarch 1859a, p. 13.
- ^ Plutarch 1859b, pp. 288–289.
- ^ Plutarch 1859a, p. 23.
Sources
[edit]- Bury, J. B. (1975). A History of Greece. Macmillan. ISBN 978-0-333-15493-9.
- Gomme, A. W. (1963). An Historical Commentary on Thucydides. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-198-14126-6.
- Plutarch (1859a) [90–120 AD]. Clough, Arthur Hugh (ed.). . Boston, Massachusetts: Little, Brown & Co.
- Plutarch (1859b) [90–120 AD]. Clough, Arthur Hugh (ed.). . Boston, Massachusetts: Little, Brown & Co.
- Plutarch (1859c) [90–120 AD]. Clough, Arthur Hugh (ed.). . Boston, Massachusetts: Little, Brown & Co.
- Sealey, Raphael (1976). A History of the Greek City States, 700–338 BC. University of California Press. ISBN 978-0-520-03177-7.
- Thucydides (1874d) [431 BC]. Crawley, Richard (ed.). . Oxford University Press.
- Thucydides (1874e) [431 BC]. Crawley, Richard (ed.). . Oxford University Press.